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Abstract
We study whether a rm that produces and sells access to an excludable public good
should face a self-nancing requirement, or, alternatively, receive subsidies that help to
cover the cost of public-goods provision. The main result is that the desirability of a
self-nancing requirement is shaped by an equity-eciency trade-o: While rst-best ef-
ciency is out of reach with such a requirement, its imposition limits the rm's ability
of rent extraction. Hence, consumer surplus may be higher if the rm has no access to
public funds.
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An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title \Incomplete Contracts and Excludable
Public Goods".
yI beneted from conversations with Sophie Bade, Pierre Boyer, Christoph Engel, Alia Gizatulina,
Martin Hellwig, Jos Jansen, J orn L udemann, Stefan Magen, and Lydia Mechtenberg.1 Introduction
This paper studies whether a rm who produces and prices an excludable public good
should face a self-nancing requirement, or whether tax revenues should be used to cover
parts of the costs. If we think of the excludable public good as a bridge, the question that
is addressed in this paper can be framed as follows: Should the nancing of the bridge rely
exclusively on tolls, or is there a role for a head tax that every inhabitant of the relevant
city has to pay, irrespectively of whether he will cross the bridge frequently or only rarely.
Alternatively, if the excludable public good is a network for telecommunications, the
question is whether this infrastructure investment must be nanced exclusively out of the
revenues that can be generated by selling telecom services, or whether there is a role for
taxes.
The disadvantage of self-nancing requirements is that they induce distortions. Con-
sumers are excluded from the consumption of the public good, even though, because of
non-rivalry, admitting them involves no cost. If the rm has no access to public funds
these ineciencies cannot be avoided. By contrast, if tax revenues are available, we can
get rid of these ineciencies.
This observation is a challenge for the literature on public-sector pricing problems in
the tradition of Ramsey (1927) and Boiteux (1956) which is based on the premise that a
self-nancing requirement is in place. It is subject to a similar critique as the one voiced
by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) who question the relevance of Ramsey models of taxation
in economies with a representative agent. In these models, lump-sum taxes are a rst-best
solution to the policy problem at hand. Therefore, the Ramsey tax problem is interesting
only if lump-sum taxes are assumed unavailable. This makes the characterization of
an optimal tax system a somewhat contrived exercise. Analogously, nding an optimal
mechanism for the provision of an excludable public good in the presence of a self-nancing
requirement appears to be an articial problem.
This paper provides a justication for self-nancing requirements. As a main result, it
is shown that their imposition may be the optimal reaction to an equity-eciency trade-
o. This trade-o involves, on the one hand, a comparison of the total surplus from
public-goods production which is higher if there is no such requirement, and an assess-
ment of the distribution of the surplus between consumers and the producer of the public
good, on the other. In particular, the imposition of a self-nancing requirement may lead
to a higher level of consumer surplus.
This result is derived in a model in which a prot-maximizing rm proposes a mechanism
for the provision and nancing of the public good. The rm is, in turn, supervised by a
policy maker who has to approve the rm's proposal. The policy maker remains ignorant
about the state of demand (as shaped by the distribution of public-goods preferences)
1and supply (as shaped by production costs). However, she has probabilistic beliefs about
demand and supply and can therefore assess the expected performance of a mechanism
that the rm proposes. Under these premises, the policy maker formulates an optimal
rule for approving the rm's proposals. We compare two alternatives for formulating such
a rule: Rule A, a minimal level of expected consumer surplus, so that a mechanism is
approved only if it exceeds this threshold; Rule B, a reservation utility level, so that every
consumer's expected utility has to be larger than this reservation utility level.
We will show that these alternatives can be interpreted as follows: Rule A is equiv-
alent to a model where the rm has to deliver an upfront payment in order to become
the provider of the public good, and then has to propose a mechanism subject to the
requirement of a non-negative level of consumer surplus. In particular, this mechanism
may involve lump-sum contributions, i.e., payments which do not depend on a consumer's
demand of the public good. Rule B is equivalent to a model where, again, the rm has to
deliver an upfront payment and then faces a self-nancing requirement when producing
the public good. This makes it impossible to acquire payments from consumers with no
demand for the public good.
In both models, the upfront payment can be interpreted as a tax on the rm's expected
prots.1 Under B, setting this tax is all that the policy maker has to do. Rule B therefore
gives rise to a situation where a rm is subject to a tax on prots and then chooses a
mechanism subject to a budget constraint that does not include tax revenue as a source of
income. This setup is akin to the public sector pricing models in the tradition of Ramsey
(1927) and Boiteux (1956). Under A, by contrast, the policy maker grants access to tax
revenues provided that the rm delivers a minimal level of consumer surplus. This is
akin to a model of procurement or regulation where a rm receives subsidies in exchange
for a commitment to meet a certain performance standard. We say that a self-nancing
requirement is desirable if the expected level of consumer surplus that can be obtained
under Rule B exceeds the expected level of consumer surplus that can be obtained under
Rule A.
A comparison of these rules yields the following trade-o. Under Rule A, any mecha-
nism generates a rst best level of total surplus. However, the expected level of consumer
surplus under this mechanism is zero. The only source of consumer surplus is therefore the
redistribution of prot income via the tax system. Under Rule B, by contrast, consumers
not only receive their share of prot income, but are also guaranteed an information rent.
The combination of information rents and tax revenues that is possible with Rule B may,
from the consumer's perspective, be more attractive than the reliance just on tax rev-
enues if Rule A is used. At the same time, however, using Rule B implies that rst-best
outcomes can not be reached.
We will show that the imposition of a self-nancing requirement is desirable if there
1Such taxes have been considered before in the literature on regulation; see Loeb and Magat (1979).
2is a substantial uncertainty about the rm's production costs. Being uncertain about the
rm's protability, a policy maker may shy away from prot taxation because he fears
that otherwise the rm may go out of business, so that there would be no public-goods
provision at all. This may leave substantial prots to the rm. In this case, the use of
Rule B, which limits the rm's capability of rent extraction, is more attractive from the
consumers' perspective.
This model is based on an incomplete contracts approach in the sense that the policy
maker's interaction with the rm is not derived from an optimal plan that is responsive
to all conceivable state and demand contingencies. Instead, the rm proposes a mecha-
nism and the policy maker decides whether or not to approve the rm's proposal. This
decision is based on a rule that is optimal, conditional on the assumption that the policy
maker is uninformed about the current state of demand and supply.2
This approach admits two dierent interpretations: First, in some cases the rules an-
alyzed in this paper may be viewed as descriptive of real-world institutional settings. For
instance, if we think of TV channels as being excludable public goods, a rm may pro-
duce and sell access to this public good without any substantial government interference,
and in particular without receiving tax revenues. An alternative, however, would be a
national TV channel that is nanced by lump-sum contributions and which is subject to
stricter performance standards.3 Other examples are streets, highways, or railroads. Such
infrastructure can be nanced by relying on user fees, or on tax revenue, or a mixture
of the two. This paper sheds light on the question which of these alternatives is prefer-
able, under the assumption that the institution in charge of organizing its provision is
self-interested and can be monitored only in an incomplete way.4
Second, the legal framework for the interaction between a rm and a policy maker may
require the use of general rules, as opposed to micro-management by the policy maker.
2The term \incomplete contracts" is used in dierent ways by dierent authors. This paper's approach
is in line with Hart (1995) who views absence of complete contingent planning as the source of incom-
pleteness. Alternatively, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) summarize contributions to the hold-up problem
under the heading \incomplete contracts". That said, having incompleteness in one way or another is
necessary for the result that a self-nancing requirement  a la Ramsey (1927) and Boiteux (1956) may be
desirable. Trivially, the mechanism proposed by a benevolent policy maker with full commitment power
yields more consumer surplus if it is possible to violate such a requirement.
3A further example has recently been provided by the Swiss Poste, a national monopolist, that reported
plans to nance mail services not only by charging the senders of mail but also the receivers by means of
a lump-sum contribution requested from every household with a mailbox (Baseler Zeitung, 5 December
2009). I am grateful to Jos Jansen for bringing this example to my attention.
4Often this infrastructure is run by the state, as opposed to a private rm. The framework developed in
this paper would still be applicable under the assumption that the responsible politicians or bureaucrats
may try to extract some of the surplus for themselves. This argument is developed more fully in a
companion paper, Bierbrauer (2009), which relates the desirability of a self nancing requirement to a
policy maker's degree of benevolence.
3As an example, think once more of a privately-run TV channel. In this context, a policy
intervention would have to be based on a legal rule that applies equally to all rms in this
business and which can not be tailored to specic demand and supply conditions.5 This
implies that any intervention (e.g., a regulation of admissible content, or a regulation
of time available for commercials) has to be based on a rule that is incomplete in the
same way as Rules A and B are, namely that it cannot be made fully contingent on all
conceivable states of the environment (e.g., whether or not there is a major sports event).
Hence, this paper's approach to model government interventions as rules that cannot be
made fully contingent on all conceivable states of the economy has a wider scope, and
is not limited to situations where the only policy choice is whether or not a rm should
receive subsidies.
This can also be seen if we think of the excludable public good as being a regulated
natural monopoly { for instance, a telecommunications network { and assume that the
policy maker is a regulatory agency. Admittedly, regulatory agencies often engage in
micro-management in the sense that try to make their interventions contingent on current
demand and supply conditions. If, say, the owner of the telecommunications network sells
access to providers of telecommunication services, the regulatory agency may have to
approve the access pricing schedule; and for this purpose it may use information about
costs and demand. However, an institutional framework for regulation typically works
such that a regulated rm makes a proposal and that the regulatory agency then reacts
to this proposal. It seems reasonable to assume that the regulator evaluates this proposal
without having access to all the pieces of information that the rm has used. (If the
regulator had all the relevant information, she could just prescribe the use of the optimal
mechanism, and it would make little sense to let the rm propose something.) But then,
the best the regulator can do is to behave optimally, conditional on being imperfectly
informed. This does again imply that an incomplete contracts perspective, similar to the
one developed in this paper, would be warranted.
The provision of an excludable public good by a regulated rm is a common practice
in reality, e.g., in the areas of public transportation, telecommunications, electricity gen-
eration or other network industries. Moreover, for the nancing of such infrastructures
tax revenues and user fees are alternatives which are both used in practice. This paper
shows that a complete reliance on user fees may be desirable in order to limit the rm's
capability of rent extraction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a more
5To give a specic example for such a legal rule, article 19 in Germany's constitutional law posits
that a law may restrict basic rights, one of which being economic freedom, only if it takes the form of a
general rule: \Insofar as, under this Constitutional Law, a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant
to a law, such law must apply generally and not merely to a single case."
4detailed literature overview. Section 3 species the economic environment. Section 4
contains benchmark results under the assumption that there is a benevolent mechanism
designer. Section 5 contains the incomplete contracts approach and the derivation of the
main result. The last section concludes.
2 Related Literature
The paper draws on a literature that uses a mechanism design approach to characterize
an optimal allocation of excludable public goods under the constraint that participation
in the system is voluntary; see Schmitz (1997), Hellwig (2003), and Norman (2004).
This literature is related because, as we will show, a mechanism design problem with
participation constraints has many similarities with a problem of public sector pricing
subject to a self-nancing requirement. This observation has previously been made by
Hellwig (2007), albeit in a somewhat dierent model. Moreover, Hellwig (2007) does not
address the question whether the imposition of participation constraints, or, equivalently,
of self-nancing requirements is desirable.
The work by Schmitz (1997), Hellwig (2003), and Norman (2004) contains character-
izations both of welfare and of prot-maximizing mechanism. Some of the characteriza-
tions in this paper are similar. However, there are also some dierences. Most notably,
Schmitz (1997), Hellwig (2003), and Norman (2004) assume that there is a commonly
known technology for the production of the public good.6 Here, by contrast, there is a
rm with private information about costs, which is an assumption that is typically made
in the literature on regulation; see Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laont and Tirole
(1993). This is important for our main result. As will be shown below, with a commonly
known technology, we cannot justify the requirement of self-nancing.
Finally, this paper uses ideas from the literature on incomplete contracts.7 In partic-
ular, it compares a setting where a benevolent mechanism designer engages in complete
contingent planning of nal outcomes to a setting where a policy maker delegates this
task to a self-interested rm and therefore can remain ignorant with respect to infor-
mation about preferences and technologies. This approach, which is meant to capture
some aspects of real-world institutions, provides a justication for the incorporation of
participation constraints into models of mechanism design. By its nature, mechanism de-
sign theory { viewed as an institution-free characterization of incentive-feasible outcomes
6More subtle dierences are the following: Schmitz (1997), Hellwig (2003), and Norman (2004) focus
on limit outcomes as the number of consumers goes to 1. Our analysis, by contrast, is based on an
arbitrary number of consumers. In addition, Schmitz (1997), Hellwig (2003), and Norman (2004) assume
that the consumers preferences are derived from an arbitrary atomless distributions, while, here, we work
with an arbitrary discrete distribution. This last assumption considerably simplies the analysis.
7For an overview, see Hellwig (1996) or Tirole (1999). A survey of the implications of incomplete
contracting for public-goods provision is provided by Martimort et al. (2005).
5under conditions of incomplete information { cannot itself provide such a foundation.
Typically, the notion of an equity-eciency trade-o is, in the tradition of Mirrlees
(1971), associated with problems of redistributive income taxation or social insurance.
In these models the state's power of coercion is taken as given so that participation
constraints are not included in the analysis. A major insight of this paper is that a
similar consideration may justify the imposition of participation constraints in models
of mechanism design which do not focus on redistribution, but on the aggregation of
preferences, e.g., in order to determine how much of a public good should be provided.
3 The Environment
Consumers. The set of consumers is denoted by I = f1;:::;ng. Consumer i's preferences
are given by ui = iqi   ti, where qi is i's consumption of an excludable public good, ti
is a monetary payment and i is a taste parameter that belongs to a nite ordered set
 = f0;1;:::;mg of possible taste parameters. We assume that 0 = 0, 1 = 1, etc.
Consumer i privately observes i. From the perspective of anyone else, i is a random
variable with support  and probability distribution (p0;:::;pm). The taste parameters
of dierent consumers are assumed to be independent random variables. We write  =
(1;:::;n) for the vector of all taste parameters and  i for a vector that lists all taste
parameters except i.
We impose a monotone hazard rate assumption: let p(i) and P(i) be a random vari-
ables that take, respectively, the values pl and
Pl
k=0 pk if i takes the value l, and dene
h(i) :=
1 P(i)
p(i) . We assume that h is a non-increasing function.
The Firm. There is a rm that produces the excludable public good. The rm's prots
are given by  =
Pn
i=1 ti k(q), where q := maxi2I qi, and k is an increasing and convex
cost function satisfying k(0) = 0, limx!0 k0(x) = 0, and limx!1 k0(x) = 1. The cost pa-
rameter  is privately observed by the rm. For anyone else,  is a random variable with
support f1;:::;rg and probability distribution (f1;:::;fr). We assume that 1 = r,
2 = r   1, etc., so that rms with a higher index have a superior technology.
We impose another monotone hazard rate assumption: let f() and F() be a random
variables that take, respectively, the values fj and
Pj
k=1 fk if  takes the value j, and
dene g() :=
1 F()
f() . We assume that g is a non-decreasing function.
The consumers' preference parameters and the rm's cost parameter are assumed to
be stochastically independent. Whenever we use the expectations operator E in the fol-
lowing, this indicates that expectations are taken with respect to the joint probability
distribution of  and .
Mechanisms. We use a mechanism design approach to characterize the provision and
6pricing of the excludable public good. (Proposition 1 below provides a reinterpretation of
these mechanisms in terms of price schedules that involve self-nancing requirements.)
We appeal to the revelation principle, and limit attention to direct mechanisms so that
a truthful revelation of public-goods preferences by consumers and of production costs
by the rm is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. A direct mechanism is a collection of functions
(qi;ti)n
i=1, where ti : n  f1;:::;rg ! R species i's payment as a function of the
vector of preference parameters and the rm's cost parameter; analogously the function
qi : n  f1;:::;rg ! R+ determines i's consumption of the excludable public good.








where Qi(l) := E[qi( i; ^ i;) j ^ i = l] and Ti(l) := E[ti( i; ^ i;) j ^ i = l] are
i's expected consumption and payment, respectively, in case of reporting a preference
parameter of l.8








where R(l) := E[
Pn
i=1 ti(; ^ ) j ^  = l] and K(l) := E[k(q(; ^ )) j ^  = l].
We require that expected revenues R() suce to cover the rm's expected production




l)  0 : (3)
Pricing mechanisms, lump-sum taxes and participation constraints
For the purposes of this paper, there is no loss of generality in limiting attention to
symmetric mechanisms, i.e., to mechanisms such that, for any pair of consumers i and
j, any  and any , i = j implies qi(;) = qj(;) and ti(;) = tj(;).9 We will
now demonstrate that symmetric mechanisms can be implemented by means of non-linear
pricing schedules, possibly in combination with a lump-sum tax; i.e., these mechanisms can
be implemented in a way that looks empirically more plausible than, say, a communication
game in which each agent reports her privately held information to a mechanism designer.
Denition 1 A symmetric mechanism (qi;ti)n
i=1 is called a pricing mechanism if there is
a non-decreasing schedule s : R+ ! R+ with s(0) = 0 and a number  so that, for each i
and l,
Qi(l) 2 argmaxx2R+ flx      s(x)g and Ti(l) =  + s(Qi(l)) : (4)
8The assumptions that the taste parameters of dierent consumers are stochastically independent and
also independent of the rm's cost parameter implies that all types of consumer i have the same beliefs
on  i and . Hence, we can view i's expected consumption level and payment solely as a function of i's
announcement, ^ i.
9All mechanisms that are characterized in the remainder are symmetric.
7For   0/  > 0, we say that the mechanism is a pricing mechanism without/ with
lump-sum taxes.
Proposition 1
i) A symmetric mechanism satises the consumers' incentive compatibility constraints
in (1) if and only if it is a pricing mechanism.
ii) A symmetric mechanism satises the consumers' incentive compatibility constraints




l)  0 ; (5)
for all i and l, if and only if it is a pricing mechanism without lump-sum taxes.
A proof of the Proposition is in part A of the Appendix. The Proposition 1 is a general-
ization of a result, sometimes referred to as the taxation principle, which states that the
set of outcomes that can be reached with incentive-compatible direct mechanisms and the
outcomes that can be reached with non-linear pricing or tax schedules coincide; see, e.g.,
Mussa and Rosen (1978) or Guesnerie (1995). Typically, models of non-linear pricing are
based on the assumption of a commonly known cross-section distribution of preferences.
Our approach diers in that this distribution is a random quantity; e.g., the fraction of
consumers having a k-preference is not a priori known.
If lump-sum taxes are positive, then even consumers who choose not to consume the
public good, contribute to the cost of producing it. Obviously, this makes them worse o
in comparison to a status quo with no public-goods provision at all. In fact, Proposition 1
shows that the possibility to use lump-sum taxes is equivalent to the possibility to violate
the consumers' participation constraints.
Intuitively, a pricing mechanism works as follows: Consumers buy a lottery that is,
due to risk neutrality, completely characterized by an expected level of public goods
consumption x. The pricing schedule s determines the price s(x) which they have to
pay in order to get this expected consumption level. Possibly, consumers also have to
pay a lump-sum tax . The designer of the pricing mechanism observes the consumers'
choices which are informative about their preferences, i.e., upon observing i's choice of
x he deduces i. Consequently, observing every consumer's choice of a lottery reveals .
Based on this observation, the mechanism designer then interacts with the rm in order
to learn  and determines the nal outcome (qi(;);ti(;))n
i=1.
The reason that consumers can only buy an expected { as opposed to a deterministic
{ level of public goods consumption is that, in the given environment, any mechanism
serves two purposes at the same time. On the other hand, there is a problem of cost
sharing: For a given production level, it has to be determined who should contribute
8how much to the cost of provision. On the other hand, there is a problem of information
aggregation because how much of the public good is produced depends on the vector of
preferences . This latter aspect implies that consumer i's consumption depends on the
preferences of all other consumers, which are random from i's perspective.
4 Optimal Mechanism Design
Before we introduce a model of incomplete contracts, we characterize as a benchmark case
the mechanism that maximizes expected consumer surplus S
S := E[s(;)] where s(;) :=
Pn
i=1(iqi(;)   ti(;)) ;
i.e., the ideal mechanism that would be chosen by a benevolent mechanism designer.10
In particular, we compare the outcome that is obtained if lump-sum taxes are assumed
unavailable to the outcome that is obtained otherwise. As will become clear, with a
benevolent mechanism designer, access to lump sum taxes is clearly desirable. Hence, in
this framework, a justication for a self-nancing requirement can not be found.
The following Proposition characterizes the optimal mechanism given that lump sum
taxes are available.
Proposition 2 Any mechanism (q
i;t
i)n
i=1 that maximizes S subject to the constraints in
(1), (2), and (3) has the following properties:
i) There is no exclusion. For all  and , and for all i, q
i(;) = q(;), where
q(;) := maxj2I qj(;).









= E [( + g())k(q
(;))] > E[k(q
(;)] : (6)
iii) Output is distorted downwards. For any  and , the provision level q(;) satises
the rst order condition,
n X
i=1
i = ( + g())k
0(q
(;)) : (7)
10The literature on regulation focusses on consumer surplus as the eciency criterion, see Baron and
Myerson (1982) and Laont and Tirole (1993). At the very least it is assumed that the consumer surplus
receives more weight in the policy maker's objective function. Absent this assumption, it would no longer
be desirable to limit the rm's rents and the problem would become uninteresting.
9A proof of Proposition 2 is in part B of the Appendix. The Proposition adapts some well-
known results from the mechanism design literature to the given setting. In particular, the
fact that the rm has private information about costs and that its expected prots have
to be non-negative implies that the rm is able to extract an information rent. This gives
rise to a second-best analysis which follows the same logic as a rst-best analysis, except
that the cost function of the rst-best analysis is replaced by the virtual cost function;
( + g())k(q) ;
i.e., the costs are in
ated by the presence of the hazard rate g(). These results have
been established by Baron and Myerson (1982) for a model of private goods provision by
a regulated monopolist, with no private information on the preferences of consumers. A
model with private information on preferences and a commonly known cost function has
been studied by d'Aspremont and G erard-Varet (1979). Given the virtual cost function,
Proposition 1 reproduces their result that rst-best allocations of public goods can be
attained if consumers have private information on their preferences.11
The optimal mechanism in Proposition 2 relies on the availability of taxes for the
nancing of the public good. The following Proposition shows what the second-best
mechanism looks like if these taxes cannot be used, or, equivalently, if the consumers'
participation constraints have to be respected.
Proposition 3 A mechanism (q
i;t
i)n
i=1 that maximizes S subject to the constraints in








 E[( + g())k(q
(;))] : (8)
If condition (8) is violated, then the mechanism (q
i ;t
i )n
i=1 that maximizes S subject to
the constraints in (1), (2), (3) and (5) has the following properties:





0; if i < l ;
q(;); if i  l :
(9)
where q(;) := maxj2I q
j (;).









= E [( + g())k(q
(;))] : (10)
11Their analysis is based on a pure public good, as opposed to a non-excludable public good. This
dierence is, however, inconsequential because the conditions characterizing a rst-best allocation of pure
public goods are equivalent to those for excludable public goods.
10iii) Output is distorted downwards, even in comparison to Proposition 2. For any  and










= ( + g())k
0(q
(;)) ; (11)
for some number  > 0.
A proof of Proposition 3 is in part B of the Appendix. The Proposition claries the
conditions under which the optimal mechanism in Proposition 2 violates the consumers'
participation constraints. The maximal expected revenue that can be extracted from








The interpretation is that, due to the interplay of incentive and participation constraints,
consumers can now also reap an informational rent. Consequently, one can make them
pay for their consumption of the excludable public good only up to their virtual valuation
of the public good which is given by (i   h(i))qi. Given that the consumers' expected
payments are limited, the optimal mechanism in Proposition 2 satises the consumers'
participation constraints if and only if, given that (qi)n
i=1 = (q
i)n
i=1, the sum of the virtual
valuations exceeds the virtual cost of providing the non-excludable public good.
It can be shown that, if the number of consumers is suciently large, then condition
(8) is always violated.12 The reason is that, with many consumers, a single consumer's
impact on the provision level q is close to zero. Hence, if there is no threat of exclusion
and, due to participation constraints, consumers can drive their contribution to the costs
down to zero, then the only way to achieve incentive compatibility is to have a zero
contribution for everybody in the rst place. But this implies that there is insucient
revenue to nance a positive supply of public goods.
Finally, Proposition 3 states the properties of the optimal mechanism that satises
the consumers' participation constraints, if condition (8) is violated. In particular, now
the possibility of exclusion is used. The threat of exclusion makes it possible to raise
more funds to nance public goods provision and therefore becomes a valuable tool in
the hands of the mechanism designer. Also, since consumers will not pay more than their
virtual valuation, there is a further downward distortion of output { relative to the one
already identied in Proposition 2.
12Related results have been established by Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and Hellwig (2003). In these
papers, the density p is assumed to be atomless, which implies that condition (8) is violated irrespective
of the number of consumers. Here, condition (8) may be satised with nitely many consumers, but is
certainly violated if the number of consumers is suciently large. A proof is available upon request.
11On the desirability of lump-sum taxation
The results above have documented that the absence of lump sum taxes, or, equivalently,
the imposition of participation constraints generates distortions. Specically, consumers
are excluded from the consumption of a public good that they would otherwise enjoy
and there is underprovision of the public good. Hence, maximizing expected consumer
surplus subject to participation constraints is bound to lead to a smaller level of consumer
surplus. This suggests that the imposition of participation constraints, or equivalently, the
exclusion of lump-sum taxation for public goods nance cannot be justied, and therefore
questions the relevance of the theory of public sector pricing in the tradition of Ramsey
(1927) and Boiteux (1956) which is based on the assumption that lump-sum taxes are
unavailable.
This criticism cannot be overcome in a pure mechanism design framework. As we have
just seen, to every mechanism that satises participation constraints/ excludes lump-sum
taxes, there is a superior mechanism that violates participation constraints/ relies on
lump-sum taxation; unless condition (8) is satised, in which case the two approaches
yield equivalent results. In the following section, we will therefore change the perspective
and look at the provision of public goods with an incomplete contracts approach. It will
be shown that, in this framework, we can derive conditions under which the imposition
of a self-nancing requirement is desirable.
5 An incomplete contracts perspective
The benevolent mechanism designer of the preceding section engages in complete contingent-
planning. For every possible conguration of the consumers' preferences  2 n and every
possible technology of the rm , she species, for each consumer i, a payment ti(;)
and a consumption level qi(;).
In the following, we will instead assume that the task of mechanism design is delegated
to the rm, i.e., the rm is in charge of adjusting its production level and pricing policy
to the details of demand and supply conditions. A policy maker has to approve the
mechanism that has been designed by the rm. This relation between the policy maker
and the rm is incomplete since the former is neither involved in the design, nor in the
execution of the mechanism. She only formulates a rule for approving the rm's proposal.
This rule is chosen optimally under the assumption that she remains uninformed about
the current state of preferences and technologies.
We compare two versions of such a rule. The rst version, Rule A, species a minimal
level of consumer surplus that the rm has to deliver. The second version, Rule B,
species a reservation utility level so that each consumer's expected utility must exceed
this reservation utility level. We show that these models can alternatively be described
12in a way that looks empirically more plausible: The policy maker sets a tax on the
rm's expected prots and redistributes the proceeds to consumers. The rm is entitled
to produce the public good only if it is willing to pay this tax. Under Rule A, the
policy maker approves the mechanism proposed by the rm if it generates a non-negative
level of consumer surplus. In particular, this includes the possibility to use lump-sum
taxes. Under Rule B the rm's mechanism has to satisfy the consumers' participation
constraints. Put dierently, the rm has to use a pricing mechanism with a self-nancing
requirement. If the approach in B turns out to be superior from the policy maker's
perspective, we say that a self-nancing requirement is desirable.
The main insight of the analysis below is that the desirability of self-nancing is shaped
by the following trade-o: If self-nancing is required the consumers participation con-
straints have to be respected. This has the advantage that consumers are guaranteed
an information rent so that there is a minimal level of consumer surplus. The disadvan-
tage, however, is that rst-best outcomes are out of reach so that there will be exclusion
and a downward distortion of production. How these two forces play out will be shown
to depend on the fraction of the surplus from public-goods provision that the rm can
extract.
5.1 Approval rules and the taxation of monopoly prots
In the following, a rm with private information on costs proposes a mechanism. We will
represent such a mechanism as a collection of functions (qi;ti)n
i=1, where qi :  7! qi()
gives i's consumption and ti :  7! ti() gives i's payment as a function of the vector
of preference parameters. The expectations operator E henceforth refers to expectations
taken with respect to .
Rule A: A minimal level of consumer surplus
We think of the policy maker as choosing a number A so that a mechanism (ti;qi)n
i=1








 A : (12)
The rm's problem hence is as follows: Produce the public good if and only if the mecha-
nism (ti;qi)n
i=1 that maximizes expected prots, E [
Pn
i=1 ti()   k(q())], subject to the
consumers' incentive constraints in (1) and the policy maker's approval rule in (12), yields
a non-negative level of expected prots.
If we let, for each i and , t0
i() = ti()+A, this problem can equivalently be written


























 A : (14)
Consequently, we can think of the policy maker as setting tax of A which the rm has
to pay in order to be entitled to produce the public good, with the understanding that
only those mechanisms will be approved which generate a non-negative level of consumer
surplus. The rm will therefore enter only if after-tax prots under this constraint exceed
A. Otherwise, staying out would be optimal from the rm's perspective.
Rule B: A reservation utility level
Alternatively, we may think of the policy maker as choosing a number B so that a
mechanism (ti;qi)n
i=1 is approved only if every consumer's expected utility exceeds B,




l)  B : (15)
Upon dening t0
i() := ti()+B, the rm's problem can equivalently be written as follows:
Produce the public good if and only if the mechanism (t0
i;qi)n




i()   k(q())] subject to the consumers' incentive constraints in (1)
and the approval rule
lQi(l)   T 0
i(l)  0 ; where T 0
i(l) := Ti(l) + B ; (16)









 B : (17)
Hence, we can once more think of the policy maker as setting a tax, denoted by B, which
the rm has to pay upon entry. The rm then has to propose a mechanism which satises
the participation constraints in (16), i.e., the rm's mechanism must rely on self-nancing.
The optimal entry decision is as follows: Enter if and only if the maximal level of prof-
its that can be attained under this self-nancing requirement exceeds the tax payment B.
Note that under both regimes, a tax on prots is distortionary since it aects the rm's
entry decision. In particular, if the tax is set in such a way that not every type of rm
14enters, this leads to an inecient outcome since our assumptions about the cost func-
tion imply that, even with a bad technology, it is desirable to have a strictly positive
public-goods supply. This possibility is eliminated if entry is deterred.
As we will see, the policy maker may be willing to accept such ineciencies if this
makes it possible to generate more tax revenue. To see why an inecient exclusion of some
rms may be helpful in this respect, suppose that the worst type of rm makes hardly any
prot. This rm enters only if the entry fee is literally zero. But this implies that all rms
with better technology can retain all of their monopoly prots for themselves, i.e., the
possibility to channel parts of these prots back to consumers is lost. By contrast, a higher
tax inevitably leads to exclusion but makes it possible to have a signicant redistribution
of monopoly prots. The optimal tax will therefore be shaped by this equity-eciency
trade-o.
5.2 The rm's mechanism design problem
Before we discuss whether Rule A or Rule B can generate a higher level of expected con-
sumer surplus, we rst characterize the solution to the rm's mechanism design problem
in either model.
Rule A: Prot Maximization if lump-sum taxes are available
The mechanism that maximizes the expected prots of a rm with cost parameter l,
subject to the consumers' incentive constraints in (1) and the condition that the expected




Proposition 4 The mechanism (ql
i ;tl
i ) has the following properties:
i) There is no exclusion. For all  and for all i, ql
i () = ql(), where ql() :=
maxj2I ql
j (;).
ii) The expected consumer surplus under the mechanism is equal to zero, i.e., condition
(13) holds as an equality.




















15A proof of the Proposition is in part B of the Appendix. It is an adaptation of the
arguments that were used in the proof of Proposition 2, which characterized the mech-
anism that maximizes expected consumer surplus subject to the rm's incentive and
non-negative prots constraints. Proposition 4 looks at the dual problem of maximizing
expected prots subject to a minimal level of expected consumer surplus.
The Proposition shows that the removal of participation constraints and the delega-
tion of mechanism design to a prot maximizing rms eliminates all distortions. As in
Proposition 2, there is no exclusion. In addition, the downward distortion of output that
was induced by the optimal mechanism in Proposition 2 disappears. Public-goods pro-
duction satises the Samuelson rule. However, this comes at cost for consumers. Their
expected surplus is zero. Hence, the consumer's only source of utility are the revenues
that can be generated by the taxation of prots.
Rule B: Prot Maximization subject to self-nancing
Analogously, we now study the mechanism designed by a rm with cost parameter l
which has payed the entry fee and does face a self-nancing requirement, or, equivalently,
has to respect the consumers' participation constraints. The mechanism that maximizes
the expected prots of a rm with cost parameter l, subject to the consumers' incentive





Proposition 5 The mechanism (ql
i ;tl
i )n
i=1 has the following properties:





0; if i   h(i) < 0 ;
ql(); if i   h(i)  0 :
(20)
where ql(;) := maxj2I ql
j ().
































A proof of the Proposition is in part B of the Appendix. Similarly as in Proposition 3, if
we introduce participation constraints, this implies that the possibility of exclusion will
be used. However, in contrast to Proposition 3, this does not depend on whether or not
rst-best outcomes can be reached with participation constraints. The monopolistic rm
always uses exclusion because this allows to extract larger payments from consumers. A
further observation is that the consumers' information rents once more lead to a downward
distortion of output. However, the information rents also generate a signicant level of
consumer welfare. Hence, if there are participation constraints, the consumers benet not
only from the taxation of prots, but also from the mechanism proposed by the rm.
5.3 The Main Result
In the following, we refer to the sum of tax revenues and of the expected consumer
surplus generated by the rm's mechanism as total expected consumer surplus. We denote
by 
A the tax that maximizes total expected consumer surplus if lump sum taxes are
available and participation constraints can be ignored. Analogously, let 
B be the tax
that maximizes total expected consumer surplus if there is a self-nancing requirement
and participation constraints have to be respected.
With this terminology, we can now state the main result of the paper. It provides a set
conditions so that total expected consumer surplus is higher if there are no participation
constraints, and another set of conditions so that total consumer surplus is higher with
participation constraints.
Proposition 6
i) If the probability fr that the rm has the best possible technology is suciently high,
then 
A and 
B are both such that only the rm with the best technology,  = r,
enters. In this case, total expected consumer surplus is higher under rule A, i.e., if
there are no participation constraints.
ii) If the probability f1 that the rm has the worst possible technology is suciently
high, then 
A and 
B are both such that even the rm with the worst technology,










17The proof of Proposition 6 is in part A of the Appendix. The Proposition does not provide
a full characterization of optimal prot taxes. Instead it states a sucient condition
for self-nancing requirements to be desirable and a sucient condition for them to be
undesirable. The advantage of this approach is that it makes it possible to highlight the
main trade-o without having to go through all conceivable parameter constellations of
the model.13
The logic of the proof of Proposition 6 is as follows: Suppose that there is a critical
cost parameter k, so that all rms with superior technology enter and produce the
public good, i.e., the prot tax c is just equal to the prots of the critical rm, c(k),
for c 2 fA;Bg. The revenue from this entry fee is higher if lump-sum taxes are available
because the rm's prots are higher in this case. However, these tax revenues are the only
source of consumer surplus. By contrast, with a requirement of self-nancing consumers
get the revenue from prot taxation and, in addition, an information rent whenever the
rm has a cost parameter smaller than the critical value k.
The Proposition shows that there are cases where the larger revenue from prot tax-
ation is the dominant concern so that self-nancing is undesirable and other cases where
information rents are more signicant so that self-nancing should be required. To ex-
plain the logic of this trade-o, suppose rst that the probability fr that the rm has
the best technology is very close to 1. This implies that even a tax as high as c(r)
distorts the rm's entry decision with a negligible probability, and we have 
A = A(r)
and 
B = B(r). It follows from Proposition 4 that A(r) is equal to the rst-best
























is equal to the second-best surplus since qr
i is distorted downwards, and hence falls
short of the rst-best surplus. This implies that the requirement of self-nancing is not
attractive. By contrast, if the probability that the rm has a bad technology is suciently
high (i.e., if f1 is close to one), then the distortions implied by a tax on prots are drastic
and it becomes optimal to have 
A = A(1) and 
B = B(1) so that the rm enters
even if it has the worst possible technology. The fact that the technology is bad implies
in particular that A(1) and B(1) are close to zero so that there is hardly any revenue
13Proposition 7 below imposes additional assumptions so that a sharper characterization becomes
available. We will see, in particular, that participation constraints are desirable if r is a large number, f
is a uniform distribution, and k is a quadratic cost function.
18generated by the taxation of prots. In this case, the consumers' information rents become
the dominating force so that it is desirable to rely on self-nancing.
This shows, in particular, that we can nd a role for self-nancing requirements only
if we assume that there is a rm with private information about its technology. If there
was a commonly known technology, or, equivalently, only one type of rm, then case i)
in Proposition 6 applies trivially. We should let the rm maximize prots without being
impeded by self-nancing and, simultaneously, use the tax system to redistribute these
prots from the rm to the consumers. As follows from Proposition 4 this would make
it possible to reach a rst-best level of consumer surplus. Hence, a requirement of self-
nancing can be justied only if we assume that the rm has private information about
costs.
The following Proposition, which is proven in part A of the Appendix, introduces
some further assumptions so that a full characterization of the optimal taxes on monopoly
prots is possible. In particular, it provides conditions so that, the characterization in
case ii) in Proposition 6 is relevant, i.e., taxes should be set such that there is public-good
provision with probability 1, and self-nancing is desirable.
Proposition 7 Suppose that f is a uniform distribution and that k is a quadratic cost
function, k(q) = 1
2q2. If r is suciently large, the following is true:
i) The optimal prot tax with participation constraints, 
B, is such that there is public-
goods production with probability 1; i.e., the possibility to exclude some types of the
rm in order to generate more tax revenue should not be used.
ii) The optimal prot tax if there are no participation constraints, 
A, is indeterminate;
i.e., the total expected consumer surplus does not depend on which types of the rm
are encouraged to enter.
iii) Total expected consumer surplus is higher if there are participation constraints.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided a microfoundation for models of mechanism design in which the
presence of participation constraints, or, equivalently, of self-nancing requirements makes
it impossible to reach ecient outcomes. Looking at the case of a regulated monopolist
who produces and sells access to an excludable public good, it has been shown that the
requirement of self-nancing may be desirable as a way to guarantee a minimal level of
consumer surplus.
The analysis has established a link between the desirability of self-nancing and the
desirability of a tax on the monopolist's expected prots. Such a tax on prots is dis-
tortionary as it aects the rm's entry decision, i.e., the decision whether to produce the
19excludable public good at all. Such a tax may still be attractive if it raises substantial
revenue from those rms who do enter. Given that it is attractive, self-nancing require-
ments reduce the tax revenue because they reduce the rm's prots. Hence, the more
attractive the taxation of prots is, the less attractive is the imposition of a self-nancing
requirement. Conversely, if prot taxation is unattractive, then self-nancing should be
required. Otherwise consumers who buy access to the excludable public good would not
benet at all from its provision.
The analysis has completely abstracted from commitment problems. Such problems
would likely strengthen the case for self-nancing requirements. The logic is as follows.
Suppose that the policy maker has chosen a signicant tax on prots and then observes
that the rm refuses to produce the public good. But then she knows that if she lowers
the tax, eventually the rm will be ready to enter and that this will create a strictly
positive consumer surplus. Lack of commitment means that the policy maker is unable
to resist this temptation. Anticipating this behavior, the rm will be willing to produce
the public good only if the tax has been reduced to a level such that each type of rm,
even the one with the worst technology, would be willing to produce the public good.
According to our main result, such a limited taxation of prots makes the imposition of
a self-nancing requirement desirable.14
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21A Proofs of Propositions 1, 6 and 7
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Part i) Step 1. We rst show that every pricing mechanism is incentive-compatible.
Suppose, to the contrary, that a pricing mechanism is not incentive-compatible. Then








Using that, for each x 2 fQi(0);:::;Q(m)g,




l)      s(Qi(
l)) < 
lQi(
l)      s(Qi(
k)) :
But this contradicts the assumption that
Qi(l) 2 argmaxx2R+ flx      s(x)g :
Hence, the assumption that a pricing mechanism is not incentive-compatible has led to a
contradiction and must be false.
Step 2. We now show that to every incentive-compatible mechanism there is a pricing
mechanism, i.e., a mechanism satisfying the properties in (4).
Note rst that the incentive compatibility constraints imply that the provision rule
for the public good satises the following monotonicity conditions, Qi(l)  Qi(l+1) and
Ti(l)  Ti(l+1), for all i and l.15
Given an incentive-compatible mechanism, we construct a pricing mechanism as fol-
lows: The lump-sum component  is chosen such that
 = Ti(Qi(
0)) : (25)
For x 2 [0;Qi(0)], we choose
s(x) = 0 : (26)
The price of units x 2 fQi(1);:::;Qi(m)g is chosen such that
s(x) = Ti(x)    : (27)









15To see this, just add the following two incentive compatibility constraints: lQi(l)   Ti(l) 
lQi(l+1)   Ti(l+1), and l+1Qi(l+1)   Ti(l+1)  l+1Qi(l)   Ti(l).
22Finally, if x > Q(m), then
s(x) = 1 : (29)
Step 2.1 We note that, given an incentive-compatible mechanism, this schedule is





In addition, (28) implies that s is non-decreasing over the range ]Qi(k);Qi(k+1)[, and
that s(Qi(k+1))  s(x)  s(Qi(k)), for every x 2]Qi(k);Qi(k+1)[.
Step 2.2 We have to show that Qi(l) 2 argmaxx2R+ flx   s(x)g, or, equivalently,





lx      s(x) :
This is trivially true if x is such that s(x) = 1. Now suppose that x 2 fQi(0);:::;Qi(m)g.








for some k 2 f0;:::;mg. This is implied by the incentive compatibility of the mechanism.






lx      s(0) = 
lx   Ti(
0) :


























k+1))     
lx   s(x)    :
This is implied by (28), for all l  k + 1. A similar argument applies if l  k. Then it







k))     
lx   s(x)    ;
which is implied by (28), for all l  k.
23Part ii) We rst show that if a mechanism is incentive-compatible and satises par-
ticipation constraints, then the associated pricing mechanism must not involve lump-sum
payments.







0))    :





0)  0 :
Hence, it must be that
 s(Qi(
0))     0 :
Since s(0) = 0 and s is non-decreasing, this implies that we must have   0.
We now show that if a pricing mechanism has no lump-sum taxes, then this implies
that the participation constraints of all consumers are satised.
With a pricing mechanism every consumer can choose x = 0 which yields a payo of
 . Hence, it must be the case that consumer choices under the pricing mechanism at




l)    :
If   0, this implies that all participation constraints are satised.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Part i) If only the most productive rm enters and there are no participation constraints,













where we have used that r = 1. Note that 
A equals the rst-best level of surplus,
conditional on  = r. If there are participation constraints, then consumers benet from




































This is only a second best level of surplus and hence less than 
A. This implies that
consumers are better o without participation constraints.
It remains to be shown that this is indeed the optimal outcome if fr is suciently
high.
Step 1. First, consider the optimal entry fee if there are no participation constraints.












if fr is suciently high. This follows because A(r) > A(l), and fr converges to
 Pr
k=l fk
as fr converges to 1.
Step 2. Now suppose that there are participation constraints. We need to show that



































As fr goes to 1, the second term on the right hand side of this inequality goes to zero,
and we have frB(r) > (
Pr
k=l fr)B(l) for the same reason as in Step 1.
Part ii). Consider again the optimal entry fee if there are no participation constraints.











if f1 is suciently high. This follows since
 Pr
k=l fk
goes to zero as f1 goes to 1. Hence,
for f1 suciently large we have that that 
A = A(1).





































25if f1 is suciently high. Again, this follows since
 Pr
k=l fk
goes to zero as f1 goes to 1.
Hence for f1 suciently large we have that that 
B = B(1).
Therefore, if f1 is large, to see whether participation constraints are desirable, it
suces to compare the expected consumer surplus without participation constraints,
A(1), and the expected consumer surplus with participation constraints, B(1) +
Pr









which proves part ii) of Proposition 6.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Part i) If there are participation constraints, the mechanism that the rm proposes is
characterized in Proposition 5. With a quadratic cost function this mechanism has the
following properties: A consumer is admitted to consume the public good if and only if








where 1 is the indicator function, and k is the rm's cost parameter. The rm's expected
prots can be written as
B(k) =
B
k ; where B := 1
2E [(~ q())2] : (30)
The expected consumer surplus equals
SB(k) =
sB
k ; where sB := E [
Pn
i=1 1(i  h(i))h(i)~ q()] : (31)
Under the assumption that f is a uniform distribution, the optimal tax is such that even







To see this, suppose that B is such that all rms with a cost parameter larger or equal
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26It is now easily veried that this expression is decreasing in k; i.e., lowering k unambigu-
ously increases total expected consumer surplus. The optimal level of expected consumer










Part ii) If there are no participation constraints, the mechanism that the rm proposes
is characterized in Proposition 4. If the cost function is quadratic, this implies that there








where k is the rm's cost parameter. The rm's expected prots are equal to
A(k) =
A
k ; where A := 1
2E [(~ q())2] : (35)
Under the assumption that f is a uniform distribution, optimal taxation leads an optimal







the optimal tax rate is, however, indeterminate. To see this, suppose rst that the entry









Now suppose the entry fee is set such that the rms with r = 1 and r 1 = 2 enter.





r . Likewise, if we consider entry be rms with
 2 fr;r 1;r 2g we once more get expected tax revenues of
A
r , etc. The optimal level




Part iii) Given the expressions in (34) and (37), the imposition of participation con-





l > A   B :
The right hand side of this inequality is positive, simply because rst-best prots exceed
second-best prots. sB is a positive number because second-best prot maximization




l goes to innity, as r
goes out of bounds. Hence, if r is large, participation constraints are desirable.
27B Further Proofs
B.1 Preliminaries
In this part of the supplementary material, we study various auxiliary optimization prob-
lems. The proofs of the Propositions below repeatedly draw on these results.
B.1.1 Revenue maximization subject to the consumers' constraints
Revenue maximization without participation constraints.
We rst study the following optimization problem: Given a provision rule (qi)n
i=1 that
satises the monotonicity constraint Qi(l)  Qi(l+1), for all i and l, and given expected
payments (Ti(0))n
i=1 for individuals with a 0-preference, we seek to maximize expected
revenue E[
Pn








for all i, l, and k. For brevity we refer to this problem as problem AUX1. The following
Proposition characterizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 8 A solution (ti)n
i=1 to problem AUX1 has the following properties:








is binding, and all other incentive compatibility constraints are not binding.























The proof follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 The revenue that can be achieved at a solution to problem AUX1 is bounded
from above by the expression in (39). Reaching this upper bound requires that all local
downward incentive constraints are binding. Moreover, if the upper bound is reached, the
expected consumer surplus is given by the expression in (40).
28Proof Step 1. We rst establish the following: Let a provision rule (qn
i )n
i=1 for the public
good be given and let the expected payments (T n
i (0))n
i=1 of individuals with i = 0 be
given. If all local downward incentive constraints are binding, then the expected revenue
is given by the expression in (39) and the expected consumer surplus is given by the
expression in (40).
To see this, note that since all local downward incentive constraints are binding, we























































Using the law of iterated expectations once more implies that E[tn











0) + E [(i   h(i))qi()] :
This also implies that
E[iqi(;)   ti(;)] = E[h(i)qi(;)]   Ti(
0)
Step 2. To complete the proof of the Lemma, take an arbitrary decision rule (qn
i )n
i=1
as given and consider the problem of maximizing aggregate revenues subject to the local
downward incentive compatibility constraints of all individuals, and with given expected
payments, (Ti(0))n
i=1, for individuals with a 0-preference. Obviously, at a solution to
the relaxed problem all constraints have to be binding. Otherwise, for some types of
some individuals, expected payments could be increased, without violating any one of the
constraints. By the reasoning in Step 1., this implies that the maximal aggregate revenue
29is given by (39). Since this problem takes only a subset of all incentive compatibility and
participation constraints into account this expression is an upper bound on the revenues
that can be generated if decision rule (qn
i )n
i=1 is to be implemented and all incentive
constraints are taken into account.
Lemma 2 Consider a mechanism such that all local downward incentive compatibility
constraints are binding, and a provision rule so that, for all i, and all k the following
monotonicity constraints are satised, Qn
i (k)  Qn
i (k+1). Then, this mechanism satises
all incentive compatibility constraints.
Proof We rst show that if the monotonicity constraints hold, and all local downward in-
centive constraints are satised, then all downward incentive constraints (i.e., constraints
of the form kQi(k)   Ti(k)  kQi(l)   Ti(l), for some l  k) are satised. To see




























The monotonicity constraint implies that the right hand side of this inequality is larger








is satised. Iterating this argument further shows that all downward incentive constraints
hold.
In a similar way, one can show that, if the monotonicity constraints holds, then local
upward incentive compatibility { kQi(k)   Ti(k)  kQi(k+1)   Ti(k+1) for all i and
k { is sucient to ensure that all upward incentive constraints { kQi(k)   Ti(k) 
kQi(l)   Ti(l) for all i, k and l > k { are satised.
To complete the proof, we show that if all local downward incentive compatibility
constraints are binding, and the monotonicity constraint holds, then all local upward




































If Qi(k)  Qi(k 1) holds, then (41) implies (42).
Revenue maximization with participation constraints.
We dene problem AUX2 as follows: Given a provision rule (qi)n
i=1 that satises the
monotonicity constraint Qi(l)  Qi(l+1), for all i and l, we seek to maximize expected
revenue E[
Pn
i=1 ti(;)] subject to the individuals' incentive compatibility constraints in




l)  0 ; (43)
for all i, and l.
Proposition 9 A solution (ti)n
i=1 to problem AUX2 has the following properties:
i) It has all the properties stated in Proposition 8.





0)  0 ;
is binding for every individual i, whereas all other participation constraints are not
binding.
Note that if we modify problem AUX1 so that the payments (Ti(0))n
i=1 can be freely
chosen subject to the participation constraint for 0-types, Ti(0)  0, for all i, then the
solution will be such that Ti(0) = 0, for all i. To complete the proof it therefore suces
to establish the following Lemma.
31Lemma 3 Consider a mechanism that satises local downward incentive compatibility.
Suppose that for all i, 0Qi(0)   Ti(0)  0. Then, this mechanism satises all partici-
pation constraints.
Proof By assumption the mechanism satises the participation constraints for 0-












Consequently, if the participation constrained is satised for a l 1-individual, then it is
also satised for a l individual.
B.1.2 Revenue minimization subject to the rm's constraints
We dene problem AUX3 as follows: Given a provision rule (qi)n
i=1 that satises the
monotonicity constraint K(l)  K(l+1), for all l, we seek to minimize expected revenue
E[
Pn












l)  0 ; (45)
for all l.
Proposition 10 A solution (ti)n
i=1 to problem AUX3 has the following properties:








is binding and all other incentive compatibility constraints are not binding.




1)  0 ;
is binding, whereas all other non-negative prot constraints are not binding.
iii) The expected revenue equals
E[( + g())k(q(;))] ;
where q(;) := maxi2I qi(;).
32Proof Step 1. We show that, for any mechanism satisfying the the budget balance condi-
tions in (45) and the rm's incentive compatibility conditions in (44), E [
Pn
i=1 ti(;)] 
E [( + g())k(q(;))].
Let (qi)n
i=1 be an arbitrary given provision rule and consider the relaxed problem of
minimizing E [
Pn
i=1 ti(;)] subject to the budget balance condition for  = 1 and
the local downward incentive compatibility conditions for the rm, R(l)   lK(l) 
R(l 1)   lK(l 1), for all l. Since this minimization problem takes only a subset of
all budget balance conditions and all incentive compatibility conditions into account, the
solution of this minimization problem will be a lower bound to the minimal value of
E [
Pn
i=1 ti(;)] that can be obtained if all budget and incentive constraints are taken
into account.
At a solution to the relaxed problem all constraints have to be binding. Otherwise it
was possible to reduce the expected revenues for some type of rm without violating any of
the constraints of the relaxed problem, thereby attaining a lower value of E [
Pn
i=1 ti(;)].
This makes it possible to verify that R(l) = lK(l) +
Pl 1
j=1 K(j), for l 2 f2;:::;rg,



































= E [( + g())k(q(;))] :
Step 2. Suppose public goods provision is such that the following monotonicity con-
straint holds: For all l, K(l)  K(l 1). We show that, under this assumption, there is
a mechanism such that E [
Pn








, satisfying all the
budget balance conditions in (45) and all incentive compatibility conditions in (44).
Using arguments that are analogous to those in the proof of Lemma 3, we nd that if
the rm's non-negative prot condition holds for  = 1, then it also holds for all  6= 1.
The fact that all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding and
that the monotonicity constraint K(l)  K(l+1) holds for all l, implies that all rm
incentive compatibility conditions are satised. This follows from similar arguments as in
Lemma 2.
33B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We rst consider a relaxed problem of maximizing expected consumer surplus taking the
only the rm's non-negative prot conditions in (45) and the rm's incentive compatibility
conditions in (44) into account. We refer to this problem in the following as auxiliary
problem AUX4.
We will then argue, in a second step, that there is a payo equivalent mechanism
which satises also the consumers' incentive constraints in (38)
Lemma 4 The mechanism which solves the auxiliary problem AUX4 has all the properties
stated in Proposition 1.
Proof Let us assume, for a moment, that the mechanism which maximizes expected
consumer subject to (45) and (44) satises the monotonicity condition K(l)  K(l+1),
for all l. This property will be veried below.
A necessary condition for the maximization of consumer surplus is that the payments







= E[( + g())k(q(;))] (46)
where q(;) := maxi2I qi(;). Therefore we can write the problem of consumer surplus
maximization as follows: Choose a provision rule (qi)n







  E[( + g())k(q(;))]:
Now suppose that the solution to this problem involves exclusion: for some (;) there
is i such that qi(;) < q(;). Then increasing qi(;) involves no cost, i.e., E[( +
g())k(q(;))] remains unaected, but increases consumer welfare since E[
Pn
i=1 iqi(;)]
goes up. This is a contradiction to the assumption that the optimum involves exclusion.
Hence, we need have all (;), and all i that qi(;) = q(;).
We can therefore once more rewrite the problem of choosing an optimal provision rule:









  E[( + g())k(q(;))]:




i = ( + g())k
0(q
(;)) : (47)
Note that, by assumption,  + g() is an increasing function of , or equivalently,
k  l implies that k +g(k)  l +g(l). Consequently, the rst order conditions imply
that, for every , q(;k)  q(;l). This implies that the monotonicity condition
K(l)  K(l+1), for all l, is satised.
Lemma 5 There is a mechanism which solves problem AUX4 and satises also the con-
sumers's incentive compatibility constraints in (38).
Proof We rst note that the rst order conditions in (47) imply that, for every i, every l,
every  i, and every given , qi(l; i;)  qi(l+1; i;). This implies that the solution
to problem AUX4 satises the monotonicity constraints Qi(l)  Qi(l+1), for all i and l.
Now construct expected payments of individuals such that all local downward incentive














  E[( + g())k(q
(;))] : (48)
It follows from Lemma 2 that all of the consumers' incentive constraints are satised.







= E[( + g())k(q
(;))] :
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 6 A mechanism (q
i;t
i)n
i=1 that maximizes S subject to the constraints in (38),








 E[( + g())k(q
(;))] : (49)
Proof As has been shown in the proof of Lemma 5, the provision rule (q
i)n
i=1 is such that
the monotonicity constraints Qi(l)  Qi(l+1), for all i and l, are satised. It follows
from Proposition 9, that the maximal revenue that can be extracted from individuals is
therefore equal to E [
Pn
i=1(i + h(i))q(;)].
35As has been shown in the proof of Lemma 4, the provision rule (q
i)n
i=1 is such that the
monotonicity condition K(l)  K(l+1), for all l, is satised. It follows from Proposition
10 that the minimal revenue for the rm is equal to E[( + g())k(q(;))].










 E[( + g())k(q
(;))] :
Suciency of this condition can be shown by using, once more, the construction in

















we obtain a mechanism that achieves (q
i)n
i=1, satises all relevant constraints, and has the
properties stated in Proposition 1.
Consider the following problem, referred to henceforth as problem AUX5: Choose
(qi;ti)n















 E[( + g())k(q(;)) : (51)
Lemma 7 Suppose that condition (49) is violated. Then a solution to problem AUX5
has properties i), ii) and iii) in Proposition 2.
Proof We rst note that (50) has to hold as an equality. Otherwise, we could increase S
by lowering E[
Pn








  E[( + g())k(q(;))] :
If condition (49) is violated, then the inequality in (51) is binding, and the optimal
provision rule maximizes the following Lagrangean
L = E [
Pn
i=1 iqi(;)]   E[( + g())k(q(;))]
+(E [
Pn
i=1(i   h(i))qi(;)]   E[( + g())k(q(;)))
= (1 + )E
Pn
i=1(i   
1+h(i))qi(;)   ( + g())k(q(;))

;
36where  is the Langrangean multiplier which, at a solution to this maximization problem,
has to be strictly positive,  > 0.
The Lagrangean L is increasing in qi(;) if i   
1+h(i)  0 and is decreasing
otherwise. The assumption that h is a decreasing function and the observation that  > 0
imply that there there is a cuto value k > 0, so that i   
1+h(i)  0 if and only if
i  k.
Maximization of the Lagrangean requires that qi(;) = q(;) := maxi qi(;) if
i  k, and qi(;) = 0, otherwise. This establishes property i) in Proposition 2.
Given this observation, we can rewrite the Lagrangean as
L = (1 + )E
hP
fijikg(i   
1+h(i))q(;)   ( + g())k(q(;))
i
:









= ( + g())k
0(q(;)) ;
for all , and . This proves property iii) in Proposition 2.
Lemma 8 Suppose that condition (49) is violated. The level of S generated by solution
to problem AUX5 is an upper bound on the level of S is the constraints in (38), (44),(45)
and (43) have to be taken into account. Moreover, the solution to problem AUX5 can be
implemented by means of a mechanism that satises these constraints.
Proof It follows from Propositions 9 and 10 that the consumer surplus S is bounded
from above by the surplus that is generated by a mechanism that solves the following






















and that this upper bound can be reached if the monotonicity constraints Qi(l) 
Qi(l+1), for all i and l; and K(l)  K(l+1), for all l, are satised.
Obviously at a solution to this problem the constraint (52) has to be binding, because
otherwise it would be possible to increase S by lowering E[
Pn
i=1 ti(;)]. This implies







 E[( + g())k(q(;))] : (54)
If condition (49) is violated, this inequality constraint is binding, which implies that the
solution to problem AUX6 coincides with the solution to problem AUX5.
To complete the proof it remains to be shown that a solution to problem AUX5 satises
the monotonicity constraints.
To see that Qi(l)  Qi(l+1), for all i and l holds, note that the monotone hazard rate
assumption implies that i   h(i) is an increasing function. Consequently, the solution




for all i, l,  i and .
To see that K(l)  K(l+1), for all l, note that +g() also is an increasing function.




B.4 Proof of Proposition 4














 0 ; (55)
into account. We show in Step 1 that the solution to this problem has all the properties
stated in Proposition 4. We will then show in Step 2 that this outcome can also be
obtained in such a way that the consumers' incentive compatibility constraints in (38) are
satised.
Step 1. Obviously, at a solution to the relaxed problem the constraint in (55) has to be
binding. Otherwise, expected payments of individuals and therefore the rm's expected
prot could be increased. This establishes property ii) in Proposition 4. Expected prots








and the optimal provision rule (qi)n
i=1 maximizes this expression. The solution has no
exclusion (property i) in Proposition 4). Otherwise it would be possible to increase
Pn
i=1 iqi(), for some  without having to increase k(q()). This would lead to a higher
value of the objective function, so that a situation with exclusion cannot be optimal.










which is the expression for prots in part iv) of Proposition 4. Maximization of this
expression yields to the Samuelson rule, property iii) in Proposition 4.
Step 2. It is easily veried that public goods provision according to the Samuelson
rule implies that for all i, and l, the monotonicity constraint Qi(l)  Qi(l 1) is satised.
Consequently, if the expected payments for all individuals are chosen in such a way that
the local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding, then, by Lemma 2,












then by part iii) of Proposition 8, the expected consumer surplus is equal to 0.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 5
It follows from Propositions 8 and 9 that, if we limit attention to provision rules satisfying


























(i   h(i))qi()   k(q())
#
(59)







39We proceed in two steps. We rst show that the provision rule (qi)n
i=1 that maximizes
the right hand side of (59) satises properties i) and iii) in Proposition 5, Step 1. We
then show that this provision rule satises the monotonicity constraint, Step 2.
Step 1. Expected prots E [
Pn
i=1(i   h(i))qi()   k(q())] are decreasing in qi()
if i   h(i) < 0 and non-decreasing otherwise. Hence, it is optimal to have qi() = 0 in
the rst place and qi() = q() in the latter. This proves property i) in Proposition 5.



















Choosing q :  7! q() so as to maximize this expression yields property iii) in Proposition
5.
Step 2. The assumption that h is a decreasing function implies that i   h(i) is
increasing in i. Hence if property i) in Proposition 5 holds, then we have that for all
i and  i, qi(l; i)  qi(l 1; i). This implies, in particular, that the monotonicity
constraint Qi(l)  Qi(l 1) , for all i and l, is satised.
40